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LONDON OR NEW YORK? IMPLICATIONS OF THE
ENRON DEBACLE FOR LAW AND ACCOUNTING
REFORM IN HONG KONG
E
John Whitman* and Anne Carver"
The collapse of the American corporation Enron has profound and hard lessons for
Hong Kong. Enron has provided new examples of ways in which it is possible for
unethical business behaviour to be lawful, in the positivist sense of law. This article
argues that the complex relationship between the Companies Ordinance and the
protection of investors can never be stated as more than a set of principles. The
superstructure of the "public interest" rests, somewhat uneasily, on the professional
shoulders of accountants. Accounting standards fill the gap between law and ethics
in the system. The meaning of what is understood by a "true and fair view" remains
the same, whilst the "contents" (ie specific accounting regulations) can be expected
to change. A question for Hong Kong is who decides, and who should have the final
say on those "contents": the accounting profession, the stock exchange, an accounting
standard setter, the Securities and Futures Commission, or the Government?
Introduction
Enron, the company with the seventh highest revenues in the USA, filed for
bankruptcy on 2 December 20011 becoming the largest bankruptcy in Ameri-
can history. Many of the facts relating to the rise and fall of Enron are difficult
to ascertain, particularly the reasons for the sudden collapse of the Enron
share price in October and November 2001. Enron had created a large num-
ber of Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) which held investments, but these
SPEs were not consolidated in the balance sheet of Enron, although their
existence and purpose were partially disclosed in the notes to Enron's finan-
cial statements. The initial media attention after the bankruptcy was directed
* Lecturer in Accounting, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Hong Kong.
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong.
1 The first indictment arising out of the Enron bankruptcy happened in Mar 2002 - an indictment
of Andersen, the auditors of Enron, for obstruction of justice. A copy of the indictment is available at
http://www.c-span.org/enron/andersen.pdf. Further charges were expected. Several of the senior
executives of Enron who were asked to testify in Congressional hearings took the protection of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which allowed them to decline the invitation
to answer questions under oath.
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 149 2002
to allegations of concealing "off-balance-sheet" finance. Later it was discov-
ered that the most controversial SPE was Raptor. Raptor had a different purpose
from other SPEs. It was a vehicle used to underwrite the value of Enron's
investments. It was the failure of Raptor to achieve the purpose for which it
was created and an associated accounting adjustment which caused Enron to
announce the write-down of its assets and equity by US$2 billion in October
2001.2 The write-down triggered a collapse of confidence which led to the
failure of a merger in November and the bankruptcy in December.
Raptor had been discussed in an internal memo that an Enron Vice-
President, Sherron Watkins, had written in August 2001 to the chairman of
Enron, Mr Kenneth Lay.' In this memo Ms Watkins said:
"I am incredibly nervous that we will implode in a wave of accounting
scandals. My eight years of Enron work history will be worth nothing on
my resume, the business world will consider the past successes as nothing
but an elaborate accounting hoax."4
The prescience of Ms Watkins' memo and the clarity of her exposition of
the nature of the Raptor dealings with Enron made her a heroine of both
those who lost their jobs at Enron and of those investors, including employ-
ees and pensioners, who lost a great deal of money in the rapid collapse of the
Enron share price in the weeks leading up to the bankruptcy.' Ms Watkins'
behaviour in trying to avert the impending disaster contrasted markedly with
the self-serving behaviour of some of the senior executives who had made
large capital gains by selling their stock in the period preceding the collapse.
It is not our purpose in this article to provide an exposition of the issues
raised for the American body politic by the collapse of this corporation. Those
issues include energy policy, campaign finance reform, pension protection,
auditor independence and directors' duties. Our purpose is to draw lessons for
accounting regulation in Hong Kong from the Congressional hearings arising
from the bankruptcy. The hearings were marked by an almost desperate at-
tempt by US politicians to find culprits to shoulder the blame for the collapse,
combined with difficulties in establishing exactly which laws had been bro-
ken and which accounting standards had failed.
2 The write-down of equity and assets and a restatement of earnings for earlier years is documented in
the Enron SEC 8K filing dated 8 Nov 2001 on the SEC website at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1024401/000095012901503835/0000950129-01-503835.txt.
3 This memo is available as part of the documentation for a Congressional hearing by the US House
Energy and Commerce Committee at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02072002Hear-
ing485/tabl7.pdf
4 ibid.
5 Enron had a stock market valuation of approximately US$100 billion in Jan 2001. By the end of the
year, this value had evaporated completely and there were insufficient funds in the company to settle
the liabilities to creditors.
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One way of looking at the collapse of Enron for Hong Kong regulators is
to identify the fundamental differences for Hong Kong in choosing either the
New York or London model of accounting standards in terms of the coher-
ence in the value system protected in each regime.' The business of standard
setting is now left to the experts and represents an intersection of profession-
alism where law meets ethics. It goes to the heart of the Enron debate. Can
and should unethical behaviour go unpunished? Would it not obviously be
desirable to have a law to prevent all types of questionable accounting practice?
The value system underlying these questions contains the very paradox that
faces the regulators responsible for reform of Hong Kong company law, re-
form of corporate governance, and reform in the securities industry. We
therefore argue that, contrary to all expectations and popular conceptions of
the role of law in the protection of the "public interest", the accountants
must be allowed to have the final say in the question of standard setting. The
profound lesson emerging from the fall of Enron is that accounting standards
fill the gap between law and ethics for the auditors, for questions of governance,
and for the protection of the "public interest" - whatever that may be.
We start, therefore, with a consideration of Sherron Watkins' testimony
on Enron's use of Raptor to hedge its investments. We conclude that her
arguments are founded more in ethics than in law. The following section
summarises the Hong Kong approach to accounting standards and compares
the Hong Kong approach to that in the USA and the United Kingdom. Other
congressional testimony is then discussed which has highlighted the diffi-
culty of creating effective accounting regulation using a multitude of narrow
rules in the American style rather than a smaller number of broad principles
in the British style. The final section deals with the implications of these
discussions for the future development of accounting regulation in Hong Kong.
Sherron Watkins' Testimony
The following excerpt is from the testimony of Sherron Watkins to a US
congressional sub-committee on 14 February 2002. Watkins' statement on
her understanding of Enron's accounting practices with the special purpose
entity Raptor, described below, poses a fundamentally important question for
Hong Kong company law and accounting standards and contains a hard les-
son for Hong Kong regulators.
6 We use the terms New York and London to typify the American and the British approaches to
accounting regulation because these cities are the models usually held up as examples for Hong Kong
to emulate in its evolution towards "World City" status, and because they are the locations of the
main US and UK stock markets.
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"While working for Mr Fastow in 2001, I was charged with reviewing all
the assets that Enron considered for sale and determining the likely eco-
nomic impact of a sale. As part of the sale analysis I reviewed the estimated
book values and market values of each asset.
A number of assets were hedged with an entity called Raptor. Any asset
that was hedged should, for the most part, have a locked in sales value for
Enron. Meaning that despite current market prices, Enron should realise
the hedged price with Raptor.
It was my understanding that the Raptor special purposes entities were
owned by LJM, the partnership run by Mr Fastow.
In completing my work, certain Enron business units provided me with
analyses that showed certain hedged losses incurred by Raptor were actu-
ally coming back to Enron. The general explanation was that the Enron
stock backstopping the Raptor hedge had declined in value such that Raptor
would have a shortfall and would be unable to cover the hedged price it
owed to Enron.
I was highly alarmed at the information I was receiving. My understand-
ing as an accountant is that a company should never use its own stock to
generate an income gain or avoid a loss on its income statement. I contin-
ued to ask questions and seek answers primarily from former co-workers in
the global finance group or in the business units that had hedged assets
with Raptor. I never heard reassuring explanations ... "
"My understanding was that the Raptor entities basically had no other
business aside from these hedges; therefore they had collectively lost over
US$700 million. I urged Mr Lay to find out who had lost that money. If he
discovered that this loss would be borne by Enron shareholders via an
issuance of stock in the future, then I thought we had a large problem on
our hands."'
Sherron Watkins pointed out that by the time she told Chairman Ken-
neth Lay of the accounting problems that she predicted faced Enron, Raptor
owed Enron in excess of US$700 million. Raptor was one of many special
purpose entities (SPEs) created by Mr Andrew Fastow, the Chief Financial
Officer of Enron, a practice that had earned him both praise from the CFO
7 Sherron Watkins, "Opening Statement", 14 Feb 2002, Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
of the House Energy and Commerce Committee of the United States House of Representatives
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/02142002Hearing489/Watkins8O.htm.
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Magazine,8 9 and also the vilification of the media as the chief suspect in the
search for the explanations for the Enron "tragedy" after the bankruptcy of
the company in December 2001.10
The Role of Law and Ethics in the Protection of Investors
The hearing at which Sherron Watkins was testifying was entitled "Financial
Collapse of Enron Corp". At the same time as this certified public accoun-
tant was giving her clear explanation on the uses and misuses of SPEs and
off-balance sheet accounting practices, there was also taking place another
hearing by the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade
and Consumer Protection entitled "Are Current Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Protecting Investors?" The US Senate Banking Committee was
simultaneously conducting a hearing entitled "Accounting and Investor Pro-
tection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Public Companies".
The hearings identified above on 14 February 2002 are just three of many
Enron-related hearings held in Washington since December 2001." The hear-
ings can be divided broadly into two groups: one group is investigating what
happened, how it happened, and who bears most responsibility for the mis-
fortunes that befell employees and investors in the company; and the other
group is evaluating the reforms needed to prevent similar disasters ever hap-
pening again. The hearings are raising many concerns for the legal and
accounting professions in the USA, but the problems being identified and
the reforms being discussed are also clearly relevant in Hong Kong. Some of
the issues debated in Washington, we shall argue, have not been adequately
addressed by corporate governance reform as it has so far been conducted
within the SAR.
One key component of the hearings is the importance of ethics - the
professional ethics of lawyers and accountants; the ethics of directors and
managers; the ethics of the market place; and the ethics of society. Within
the debates about ethics, questions of independence and conflict of interest
are central. Several US congressmen and women have commented in these
hearings that what they find particularly shocking about the revelations is
8-9 "Fastow at center of Enron storm / Aggressive and driven, ex-CFO has many faces", Houston Chronicle
Sunday, 20 Jan 2002, p 1, Section A. By 1999, Fastow's activities had captured the attention of CFO
Magazine, which awarded him its CFO Excellence Award for Capital Structure.
10 At another congressional hearing Mr Andrew Fastow did not testify after taking the protection of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See "The Fall of Enron / Taking the Fifth",
Houston Chronicle, 8 Feb 2002, p 19, Section A.
1 These Congressional Hearings are typically available on the relevant Congressional Committee website
for viewing via the Internet, either simultaneously or subsequently. Witness testimony and the open-
ing statements by members of the committee are similarly available on the date of the hearing and
the full transcript of the hearing is typically made available during the subsequent two months.
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not the things that were done which are illegal, but that much of what was
done was within the law and sanctioned by American "generally accepted
accounting principles" (GAAP).
This article asks a question from the Hong Kong law and accounting
perspective. Is Sherron Watkins' fundamental accounting principle that a
company can never use its own stock to generate a gain or avoid a loss on its
income statement "good law" or is it simply an accounting convention that is
applied by ethical accountants in an ethical world?
The Watkins statement might be even more properly described as a sys-
tem of meta-ethics that we have come to rely upon in the complex penumbral
world of the Hong Kong Accounting Standards created by the Accounting
Standards Committee of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants." These
standards have a complex relationship to the Companies' Ordinance and the
protection of the investor. The edifice upon which the standards rest has
three elements to its foundation:
1 the investors' reliance on the auditors as the experts with their profes-
sionalism and commitment to "the public interest";
2 the criminal law's definitions of accounting offences involving
dishonesty; and
3 the development of the auditor's duty of care in the area of professional
negligence.
The problem of identifying and defining questionable "unethical" account-
ing practices is left for the most part to an assessment of what is and what is
not "professional misconduct" in the view of the Disciplinary Tribunal of the
Hong Kong Society of Accountants. This is the area between law and ac-
counting standards that we describe as the meta-ethics or the superstructure
integrating the relationship between auditor, the Companies Ordinance and
the investor. Such a superstructure relies, ultimately, on the accountants as a
professional body being able and willing to identify at any given time what is
meant by the "public interest". The collapse of Enron may in fact force Hong
Kong regulators to define what the accountants mean by "public interest" if
the relationship between law and accounting standards is to continue to pro-
vide a suitable superstructure to hold the system together.
Is the Sherron Watkins Principle "Good Law"?
The lawyers and accountants in Hong Kong ask themselves if Watkins' state-
ment is "good law", that is to say is it authoritative law (without any reference
to its ethical content) as a matter of professional training. It is, as it were,
12 The Accounting Standards Committee of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants was created in
1982.
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a reflex reaction to the events revealed in the Enron hearings. Lawyers and
accountants trained in the Hong Kong common law system and familiar with
professional accounting standards would attempt to answer the question
whether Watkins' statement represents the law in Hong Kong in the follow-
ing three ways." First, lawyers would attempt to identify a relevant statutory
principle clearly defined within the Companies Ordinance.14 Since it is not
possible to see it clearly articulated as a principle of company law in the Com-
panies Ordinance," lawyers would then, as a second attempt, seek to find it
in the Hong Kong common law system implicating and including the audi-
tors in either the area of criminal law typically associated with the duties of
company directors to the company or in the breach of the auditors' contrac-
tual duties or in negligence to third parties. The relevant criminal "behaviour"
is defined in the relevant criminal law sections in the Companies Ordinance.
These sections penalise the production of false and misleading accounts us-
ing unacceptable accounting practices. Such criminal offences involve a
deliberate attempt to mislead shareholders and third parties and must be de-
scribed as criminal offences involving dishonesty. They do not, however,
properly describe the questionable and unethical accounting practices that
this article argues are in fact represented by the Watkins statement. In addi-
tion to criminal offences, there are also developments in the law of negligence,
particularly in relation to the protection of investors in the post-Caparol6 era
13 We fully recognise that the law relating to corporate and securities law in Hong Kong can be found
in three distinct areas. The first is the common law decisional case law. The second is in the detail
of the statutes themselves, ie The Companies Ordinance (Cap 32), The Securities Ordinance
(Cap 333), The Protection of Investors Ordinance (Cap 335), The Commodities Trading Ordinance
(Cap 250), The Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance (Cap 396), and The Securities (Insider
Dealing) Ordinance (Cap 395). The third is found in the non-legal norms, ie The Listing Rules; The
Hong Kong Codes on Takeovers and Mergers and Share Repurchases; The Code on Unit Trusts and
Mutual Funds; the Code on Investment-Linked Assurance Schemes and Saving Plans; The Code on
Pooled Retirement Funds; and The Code on Immigration-Linked Investment Schemes. There is also
a fourth, less highly developed, area for the protection of investors and the jurisprudence of Hong
Kong corporate governance. This is the development of a body of administrative decisions by the
Securities and Futures Commission (SFC). This will become more important after Hong Kong's
modem facelift created by the introduction of The Securities and Futures Commission Ordinance as
new law in 2002 after a long legislative gestation period. None of these distinct areas of legal and
non-legal norms solves the problem identified by Sherron Watkins, that is pursued in this article. It
is, in fact, impossible for accountants and lawyers in Hong Kong to confirm that the Watkins' state-
ment either does or does not represent "good accounting" or "good law".
14 Cap 32.
15 Nor is the answer to be found stated as a statutory principle in any of the three areas of corporate and
securities laws listed in n 13 above.
16 Caparo industries plc (CI) v Dickman [1990] AC 605. The situation becomes even more complex in
the case of groups of companies. The English case Coulthard v Neville Russell (a firm) [1998 1 BCLC
143 highlights the point beautifully for the present argument on the expertise of auditors and on how
difficult it is to find the law backing up Sherron Watkins' statement. On the facts of Coulthard, the
auditors failed to advise the directors on the problems of a subsidiary borrowing money from the
parent company to buy the subsidiary's own shares and thus provide financial assistance in breach of
the English equivalent of s 47A. The facts of Enron are arguably not dissimilar in terms of law and
accounting principles.
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 155 2002
and the search for what public policy regards as the socially and economically
appropriate limit on the auditors' liability to an indeterminate group for an
indeterminate time for an indeterminate amount. In none of these areas of
the law, however, do we find the answer to the question raised by Sherron
Watkins' statement as to whether as a matter of law and accounting it is
possible for a company to use its own stock to generate an income gain or
avoid a loss on its income statement. Since we cannot find the answer to the
question in the Companies Ordinance, nor in the case law on auditors' liability,
we must take a third approach and investigate whether it lies in the super-
structure of the integrated relationship between law, accounting and
professional standards imposed by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants.
The Integrated Relationship of Law and Accounting Standards
Looking for the answer in the relationship of law and accounting standards
rests, finally, on a positivist view of the relationship between law and ac-
counting in Hong Kong. This answer would suggest that Watkins' statement
represents a conventional accounting practice that falls under a generally
accepted accounting principle. As such, it falls outside the strict definition of
law, but as used in certain conventional ways by the experts it has become
quasi-legal within the spirit, if not the letter, of the law. If it is not, in fact, a
legal rule, the experts, the professional accountants, must be seen not only to
understand the principle, but also to use it with certainty and predictability
as the professionals upon whom the role of trusted advisor and custodian of
financial ethics is placed.'I The problem therefore becomes one of identify-
ing the relationship of accounting standards to law," and whether the existing
Hong Kong balance is appropriate. The Watkins statement of law and ac-
counting also highlights the limitations of a positivist lawyer's view of
17 For a detailed description of the Hong Kong Auditing Guidelines setting out the Statements of
Auditing Standards in Hong Kong, see Ferdinand Gul, Hong Kong Auditing Economic Theory and
Practice (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2000), pp 683-769 where Professor Gul
sets them out for accounting students. Once again, it is impossible to find the answer to as to whether
the Watkins statement represents good accounting practice for Hong Kong.
18 Hong Kong auditors face common law liability for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and
negligence. They also face disciplinary proceedings from the Hong Kong Society of Accountants for
professional misconduct, investigation by the SFC, and are subject to the law and self-disciplinary
regulation as set out in The Professional Accountants Ordinance (Cap 50). See, for example, BDO
Binder & Others v Hong Kong Society of Accountants [2000] HKEC 962. In the Court of First Instance
Constitutional and Administrative Law List Action No 15 of 2000, three firms of accountants under
investigation pursuant to s 42C of the Professional Accountants Ordinance sought to quash the
decision of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants to set up a committee to discourage dishonourable
conduct and to investigate the failure to maintain or apply a professional standard. See also Stock J's
analysis of the role of the Hong Kong Society of Accountants in Ernst & Young (A Firm) v Hong Kong
Society of Accountants (A Body Corporate) [2000] HKEC 283. Stock J sets out the provisions of s 34,
the background to the amendments to the Ordinance in 1994, and the difficulties in statutory inter-
pretation and policy making for the professional body concerned, in terms of access, accountability
and client confidentiality.
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accounting principles which by definition check on whether a company has
acted systematically and not on the quality of the content of a company's
actions. In other words, why is it so difficult to answer the question? The
answer, it would seem, is because it is not law at all, but a statement of a
fundamental accounting principle that we expect only the experts to
understand. The question then becomes, if it is not in fact a part of any gen-
erally accepted legal principle in Hong Kong, is it good accounting?
Does the Watkins Statement Represent "Good Accounting"?
As stated by Watkins, the central relationship at issue is between the share-
holders and the directors. Shareholders have entrusted resources to the
directors and the directors are expected to "maximise shareholder value".19
This is done by increasing the value of the assets owned by the company,
which if done effectively and disclosed appropriately will be reflected in the
value of the shares and thus in the wealth of the shareholders.
This relatively simple definition of the relationship can be eroded in a
number of ways when the capital resources of the company are reduced by
decisions of the directors. The British and American legal systems seem to
have had different interpretations of the problems involved.
1 Can a company (corporation) buy its own shares and sell them again?
Yes in America.20 No in the United Kingdom.2 No in Hong Kong.22
2 Can a company (corporation) return capital to the shareholders?
Yes in America. 23 No in the United Kingdom. 24 No in Hong Kong."
19 For an extended discussion of the objectives of business and the ethics involved, see Elaine Sternberg,
Just Business, Business Ethics in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2000).
20 The practice of buying and re-issuing treasury stock (ie a corporation trading in its own shares) is
common in the United States.
21 See John Farrar, Company Law (London: Butterworths, 2nd edn, 1998), p 146. Since Trevor v Whitworth
(1887) 12 App Cas 409 it has been "unlawful" for a company to purchase its own shares as part of the
clearly articulated rules for capital maintenance under English company law, but note the relaxation
of the capital maintenance rules for private companies, closely followed by Hong Kong. For an excel-
lent analysis of the capital maintenance principle and the rule in Trevor v Whitworth, see Philip Smart
et al, Hong Kong Company Law Cases, Materials and Comments (Hong Kong: Butterworths Asia,
1997).
22 See s 47A, s 47B, s 47C and the relaxation of this rule under s 47E of the Companies' Ordinance.
23 Although each state in the US has its own company law statute, making it difficult to generalise
broadly about American company law, the concept of the "liquidating dividend", which involves the
reduction of capital, is widely discussed as acceptable practice in US accounting literature. The lack
of a clearly defined share premium account and the practice of issuing no-par value shares result in a
less well-defined concept of capital maintenance generally in the US. The variety of restrictions on
dividends described in Kenneth W. Clarkson et al, West's Business Law (Cincinnati: West Legal
Studies in Business, 8th edn, 2001), at p 671 makes it clear than in some states there is no statutory
restriction on distributing a capital surplus.
24 See John Farrar, Company Law (London: Butterworths, 4th edn, 1998), p 169. The basic principle of
English company law is that capital cannot generally be reduced without the consent of the court.
25 Restrictions on the return of capital to shareholders see Companies Ordinance s 49K, s 49L, and s 49M.
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3 Can a company (corporation) pay dividends out of unrealised profits?
Yes in America. 6 No in the United Kingdom. No in Hong Kong.28
In the United Kingdom, company law and the attendant financial report-
ing regulation were developed in the 19th century largely with the protection
of creditors in mind. To quote Hong Kong's leading expert on securities and
corporate law, and to apply it equally to Hong Kong company law with refer-
ence to the protection of creditors and financial reporting: "The developments
of the business world have left the law far behind."2 9
In the United States, federal law only started to legislate on financial re-
porting after The Securities and Exchange Act 1934 which regulates the
trading of the securities of public companies and not the accounts of all
companies, in contrast to the British Companies Act and the Hong Kong
Companies Ordinance. The underlying logic is that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) and its statutory power to regulate accounting
were created to protect investors in stock markets, and to protect the public
interest in the stability and soundness of financial markets after the Crash of
October 1929. Creditors in the United States are expected to protect them-
selves in other ways using their own devices such as debt covenants.
Examining the Sherron Watkins principle as a single precept that can be
clearly understood by accountants and laymen alike, we pursue the question
doggedly. Is it enshrined in law or is it rather a central tenet of accounting
principles? Indeed, is it even correct in USA, UK and Hong Kong law and
accounting? We find ourselves unable to answer these questions as clearly as
we would like. It is certainly implicit in the way that American companies
account for treasury stock.30 There are two methods, the cost method and the
par value method, but in neither case does any gain or loss on trading treasury
stock impact the Income Statement. Gains are credited to the US equivalent
of a share premium account (paid-in capital in excess of par) and losses may
be charged against revenue reserves.
26 See n 23 above.
27 See n 24 above.
28 See s 79B, applying across the board to all companies, private or public, listed or unlisted, except for
investment companies exempted by the Financial secretary under s 79D. Betty Ho explains the sig-
nificance of these provisions in the Companies Ordinance with clarity: "a company may not pay
dividends out of profits for the current year without 'making up' for losses of previous years. Secondly,
a company may not pay dividends out of unrealised gains." Betty Ho, Public Companies and their
Equity Securities Principles of Regulation under Hong Kong Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International,
1998), p 227.
29 See Ho (n 28 above), p 23.
30 "Treasury stock" is the American expression used in financial statements to describe shares which
have been purchased by a corporation and kept for future resale. They are, therefore, not retired on
repurchase as the shares in a British or a Hong Kong company would be in similar circumstances.
Treasury stock is shown on the balance sheet as a reduction (debit balance) set against the equity of
the company (credit balance).
(2002) HKLJ
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Given that British companies are not allowed to own or trade their own
shares the issue of gains and losses on such trades does not arise directly in
British company law in the same way as it does in accounting for treasury
stock in the USA. Nevertheless, implicit in the way that financial statements
are prepared and published is the undeniable fact that the equity in the bal-
ance sheet is supposed to represent the shareholders' claim on the assets of
the company. Logically, therefore, the size of the claim can be increased by
increases in the value of the assets, but the value of the assets cannot be
increased by increases in the value of the equity securities themselves, unless
the company invests in (purchases) its own securities, creating a circular chain
of value which it is difficult to represent. This is the reason why treasury stock
is presented in the financial statements as a reduction in equity rather than as
an asset belonging to the corporation.
The Sherron Watkins principle is one which was violated by the wide-
spread American practice of accounting for mergers as a pooling of interest,
in which it was possible for a corporation to "buy" accounting earnings with
its own stock by merging with a more profitable company in the course of a
financial year and consolidating the merged company's results for the year.
Merger accounting or "pooling" has now been outlawed by the American
Financial Accounting Standards Board - a major victory for Chairman
Edmund Jenkins who achieved this victory in the face of enormous opposi-
tion from businessmen and politicians." This achievement may easily be
overlooked in the attempt to castigate the Financial Accounting Standards
Board for its failure to regulate SPEs adequately.
% It has also been argued by Mr Jeffrey Skilling32 that the Sherron Watkins
principle was "wrong" by pointing to the widespread use of executive stock
options which reduce compensation expense by promising to issue stock in
the future. The argument used is not persuasive since the Watkins principle is
only claimed to apply to the booking of gains or the avoiding of losses." Ms
Watkins does not state that the reduction of expenses offends against her
principle. Nonetheless, Mr Skilling's example is useful in defining the prin-
ciple more closely. Mr Skilling has stated that he relied on Andersen's approval
of the Raptor transaction as being appropriate. He also has pointed out that
he is not an accountant.
31 For a more complete description of the issues raised by the prohibition of pooling, see John Whitman
and Anne Carver, "Purchase, Pooling and the Playing Field," in Horn, Norbert (ed), Cross Border
Mergers and Acquisitions and the Law, Studies in Transnational Economic Law Volume 15 (The Hague:
Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp 331-345.
32 Skilling was giving verbal testimony in response to a question at the hearing of the Senate Com-
merce Committee's Subcommittee hearing on Tuesday 26 Feb 2002. Mr Jeffrey Skilling was CEO of
Enron for a period of six months in 2001. A video recording of this hearing has been available at
http://www.c-pan.orglenron/index.asp. A transcript of the hearing will be provided later at the website
of the Commerce Committee.
33 The term "losses" is used to describe falls in the value of assets. Expenses would typically involve
expenditure. There is a clear and important distinction here.
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In the case of the Raptor transaction there was also the attendant danger
that the stock might be watered down as a result of Enron's guarantee to
Raptor. This was an important part of Watkins' reservations. By underwriting
the special purpose entity against losses arising from the put option that Enron
had purchased from it, Enron was "artificially" inflating earnings and putting
the shareholders investment at risk of dilution from the forced issue of addi-
tional shares. This was clearly an ingenious and complex piece of creative
accounting, but was it fraud? This remains to be seen. It is a clear concern of
many of the Congressmen investigating the Enron collapse that justice be
seen to be done.
We are left with the uncomfortable feeling that the Sherron Watkins prin-
ciple is ethically sound in supporting a clear and transparent view of a
company's financial position, but is nowhere enshrined explicitly in law. Per-
haps this is one reason why Sherron Watkins believed that her Chairman,
Kenneth Lay, did not "get it". "Did [Mr. Lay] understand the implications of
what you were telling him?" asked Committee Chairman Billy Tauzin, a Loui-
siana Republican. She responded, "I don't think he did", adding that his lack
of understanding was made clear when he played down the partnership prob-
lem at an October employee meeting called to discuss the company's
increasingly dire straits."
Accounting Standards: a Comparative Perspective
Hong Kong's accounting standards are themselves under the spotlight as a
result of the reforms in corporate governance, changes to the Companies
Ordinance and the legislative lag of the Securities and Futures Bill. There are
also uncomfortable home truths revealed by the Enron inquiry about where
the legislative power lies and about the accountability of auditors and direc-
tors in law. If we accept the importance of accounting standards for Hong
Kong, the question then becomes one of establishing who is responsible for
setting the accounting standards in the USA, the UK and Hong Kong and
examining the sources of legislative power in each jurisdiction. With many
questions facing Hong Kong's terms of reference for its future as a financial
centre, the choice of a corporate governance, securities and accounting model
narrows down to a basic choice between following London or New York.
Hong Kong could perhaps also choose eclectically between different features
of the two jurisdictions, a more difficult third choice. The Enron Congres-
sional hearings have emphasised the significance of the choice to
be made. Quite possibly, Hong Kong's legislative lag may turn out to be an
34 Tom Hamburger, "Watkins Tells of 'Arrogant' Culture; Enron Stifled Staff Whistle-Blowing", Wall
StreetJournal, 15 Feb 2002.
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opportunity for reflection on the underlying and essential differences between
the London and New York models.
Earnings management, auditor independence, off-balance sheet finance,
and the difficulties of accounting for derivative transactions such as options,
especially stock options, have been the subject of professional and academic
debate for many years, and have previously involved a great deal of congres-
sional pressure on the US standard setters to moderate the severity of proposed
regulations." These issues have, however, never before given rise to such
widespread public concern in the USA or in the UK, and certainly not in
Hong Kong. The time has come for such issues to be addressed, not as a mat-
ter for academic debate, but as a statement of social, economic and
philosophical values supporting a clearly positivist view of the legal system
itself. If such accounting issues are not to be seen as a statement of values,
then it becomes impossible to defend the gap between law and ethics that the
collapse of Enron has so clearly emphasised.
The United States' Position
The legislative power in the USA to set accounting standards for companies
listed on stock exchanges is vested in the SEC which in turn delegates its
powers to the FASB."6 As one commentator puts it:
"The division of responsibility between the FASB and the SEC can gener-
ally be said to be that the FASB is concerned with measurement standards,
and the SEC generally restricts itself to disclosure matters ... However
this distinction is difficult to maintain in practice.""
The United Kingdom's Position
In the UK, prior to the 1985 Companies Act, British standard setters on ac-
counting principles were held to be the experts on what was and what was
not "good accounting practice". Since 1985, and the consolidation of the
Fourth European Directive into British company law, there is a much clearer
3 One of the key contentious issues is the desire of the FASB to require companies to show the fair
value of executive stock options as an expense in the Income Statement at the time they are granted.
This proposal was eventually defeated by congressional pressure and Arthur Levitt, a former chair-
man of the SEC, accepts that failing to give more SEC support to the FASB may have been the
biggest mistake he made in his period as Chairman. This view was expressed as verbal testimony to
the Senate Banking Committee on 12 Feb 2002. The video of this hearing has been available at
http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/021202/index.htm, and the full transcript of the hearing will
eventually be available on the same website.
36 The Financial Accounting Standards Board was created in 1973 to be a body independent of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) after public (and SEC) dissatisfaction
with the development of accounting principles by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), an inter-
nal committee of the AICPA.
37 Michael Bromwich, "Accounting Regulation and the Law," in Michael Bromwich and Anthony
Hopwood (eds), Accounting and the Law (Hemel Hempstead: Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd,
1992), p 91.
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codification of accounting practices. Since 1989, the final arbiter on what
is and what is not a "true and fair view" is the European Court of Justice.
Nevertheless, there is, as yet, no clear decision as to whether a more legalistic
approach to UK accounting standards is appropriate. Nor, it seems, is the UK
keen on an equivalent to the SEC regulating its standards, believing such a
public sector agency to be susceptible to political pressure. This aspect of UK
accounting standard setting is discussed below under the heading "Lessons for
Hong Kong" and represents a particularly instructive lesson for Hong Kong
regulators in the development of Hong Kong corporate governance, account-
ing standards and the relationship between law and accounting in Hong Kong.
In addition, the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB) replaced the UK
Accounting Standards Committee in 1990. Despite the influence of the Fourth
European Directive and the codified aspects of accounting now to be found in
the UK Companies Act of 1989, the ASB is still seen as essentially a self-
regulating body. Recently the British system and its preference for self-regulating
bodies have been strengthened by the creation of the Accounting Foundation
which controls a disciplinary body designed to regulate audit practice.
This article does not attempt to set out the history of self-regulating bod-
ies in US or UK administrative law, nor to investigate the difficult question
of where the funds to finance these self-regulating bodies come from."
Nevertheless, the political question remains as important as ever: Can such
bodies ever be said to be "effective" and "objective" if their funding comes
from the people whose behaviour they are regulating?
The Hong Kong Society of Accountants as a Standard Setter -
a Self-Regulating Body
In Hong Kong, there is a typically British system in place with the accounting
standards being set by the Hong Kong Society of Accountants. One particu-
lar difference to note with the Hong Kong position is that the Hong Kong
Companies Ordinance does not require the directors to provide additional
information to explain where there is a discrepancy between the true and fair
view and the statutory requirements. In the 1989 UK Companies Act it is
38 This has been the subject of much debate in the UK. See particularly John Holland, "Self-Regulation
and the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance" (March 1996) Journal of Business Law 127.
Holland examines the links between funding and "voluntary" relationships from the perspective of UK
financial institutions. For an assessment of the public law dimension and the practical limits on self-
regulation, see Tom Lowe, "Public Law and Self-Regulation" (August 1987) Company Lawyer 115.
Self-regulation is said to be an emotive and ambiguous term. Lowe comments that a system whereby a
group of persons force themselves to comply with a code is said to be "very different to self-regulation in
the sense of voluntary submission to or observance of a code inspired by self-interest or particular moral
belief', p 118. In which sense do Hong Kong accountants submit to their code and professional ethics?
Who funds the body? Where, ultimately, lies the coercive power of law that legitimates the rule-book of
the professional body?
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implied that there will be no discrepancy between the statutory requirements
of company law and the true and fair view since the directors are obliged to
provide additional information in the event of such a discrepancy. Hong Kong
currently falls somewhere in the middle between the US and UK standards
and the true and fair view and responsibility put on the directors to explain
discrepancies in the accounts. It can, to date, be described as a self-regulating
system.
Lessons for Hong Kong
In February 2002 the US Senate Banking Committee conducted hearings on
"Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other Pub-
lic Companies". The first hearing on 12 February consisted of testimony on
the subject from the last five retired chairmen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission in Washington. All of these gentlemen had suggestions for reform.
The second hearing on 14 February took testimony from Sir David Tweedie
and Mr Paul Volcker - Mr Alan Greenspan's predecessor as chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. Sir David Tweedie was formerly Chairman of the ASB,
created in 1989, and is now Chairman of the International Accounting Stan-
dards Board (IASB) created in January 2001.3 Mr Volcker is chairman of the
trustees of the IASB and responsible for fund-raising. 40 He has also accepted
an honorary appointment to oversee reforms within Andersen, the account-
ing firm who were, until December 2001, the auditors of Enron. Much of this
second hearing consisted of discussion about the differences between the ac-
counting standard setting process in the American tradition and in the British
tradition. The question of who should finance accounting standard setting
also generated concern.
At the February 12 hearing the head of the New York University account-
ing department was quoted on the subject of the American Financial
Accounting Standards Board: "It's the old adage of an FASB rule. It takes
four years to write it, and it takes four minutes for an astute investment banker
to get around it."4 1 Sir David Tweedie's testimony to the Senate Banking
Committee contained, amongst other things, an explanation of the differing
philosophies of accounting standard setting in the US and the UK. This is
the issue on which we would like to concentrate.
39 The IASB is the successor to the International Accounting Standards Committee.
40 In an interesting revelation, it was disclosed that Mr Volcker had solicited funds from Enron. The
company expressed an interest if they could gain sufficient access to influence the standards that
were being set. The sum suggested, $500,000 over five years, was never given.
41 This quotation is attributed to Paul Brown by the Honorable Roderick M. Hills, Chairman of the
SEC 1975-1977 in his written testimony, and see n 5 above.
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"In my view, the US approach is a product of the environment in which
US standards are set. Simply put, US accounting standards are detailed
and specific because the FASB's constituents have asked for detailed and
specific standards ... The IASB has concluded that a body of detailed
guidance (sometimes referred to as 'bright lines') encourages a rule-book
mentality of 'Where does it say I can't do this?'... adding the detailed
guidance may obscure, rather than highlight, the underlying principle.
The emphasis tends to be on compliance with the letter of the rule rather
than on the spirit of the accounting standard ... . Our approach requires
both companies and their auditors to exercise professional judgement in
the public interest."42
We quote from Sir David's testimony at some length because it does con-
trast a British with an American approach to accounting standards and
therefore emphasises that there is a choice here for regulators in Hong Kong.
It also raises the issue of the limits to rule making and the need for "profes-
sional judgement in the public interest".43 It raises questions about the
importance of clarity and the need to educate the public if we are to restore
faith in the value of the auditors' "professional judgement" in the context of
the protection of the public interest.
The Law and Accounting Dilemma
Tweedie emphasised that there is a lesson for us all in the Enron collapse:
"History is full of examples of those who said 'it couldn't happen here' and
came to regret it." The relevance to Hong Kong perhaps is that it is not
clear that the government or the regulators at the SFC or the Stock Exchange
are sufficiently involved with accounting issues to act purposefully enough to
give Hong Kong the high standard of corporate governance that its position
as one of the most important financial centres in the world requires.
One perception in Hong Kong is that the government is overly influ-
enced by business interests and finds it difficult to act independently enough
to give Hong Kong the level of regulation it needs. So far, with the possible
exception of the Carrian case, accounting has not truly been a political issue
in Hong Kong, and certainly not a matter which raises widespread public
concern. The stock market is perceived as being simultaneously a club for
the wealthy businessman and a casino for the man in the street. It is not yet
42 Sir David Tweedie, Testimony Senate Banking Committee, 14 Feb 2002 on Accounting and Other
Investor Protection Issues raised by Enron and Other Public Companies. See the Senate Banking
Committee website, http://banking.senate.gov/02-02hrg/021402/tweedie.htm.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
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perceived as a custodian of the citizenry's dream of an affluent retirement.
The Asian financial crisis and the subsequent fall-out has implicated
accountants in the recent economic slowdown in a number of Asian countries,
but that issue has not consistently hit the headlines in Hong Kong or created
real media attention. Nonetheless, interest in corporate governance has con-
tinued to grow over the last 10 years, simmering on the back-burner. The real
question is whether the Hong Kong government will choose between the
New York model or the London model with a clear perspective on the need
to identify the gaps. We need to achieve an overall coherence between law
and accounting despite, or perhaps because of, the gaps between law and eth-
ics that the Enron debate on law and unethical accounting practices has so
publicly highlighted.
The Gap Between Law and Ethics
Many observers credit at least part of the success of the American economy
over the past eight years to the regulatory framework developed by the SEC
and to the role played by Arthur Levitt, its recently retired Chairman, in
cleaning up some of the abuses in the market. The legal profession is clearly
implicated in the collapse of Enron and questions are now being asked about
the role of Enron's legal counsel in evaluating the legitimacy of Enron's spe-
cial purpose entities. Indeed, the lawyers are included in Arthur Levitt's list
of the key actors in the financial system in his testimony to the Senate Bank-
ing Committee on 14 February: "Managers, auditors, directors, analysts,
lawyers, rating agencies, standard setters and regulators.""
The Enron debacle has also highlighted how quickly success can turn to
failure. For many years, Enron was held up as an icon of American capitalism
- a most successful and innovative company. In a turn of fortunes, reminis-
cent of the speed and impact of the East Asian financial crisis, Enron's
bankruptcy set in train a series of events the implications of which go far
beyond the failure of one company, albeit one of the largest in the USA. The
Enron collapse has created waves that have spread into many aspects of Ameri-
can economic and political life. The regulators, lawyers, accountants and
investors in Hong Kong must now consider what impact the Enron events
will have on the corporate governance, legal and accounting reforms in Hong
Kong. At a profound level, the collapse of Enron forces us to consider the
question of how we can justify unethical laws. It brings to the surface of po-
litical debate the significance of rules and morality and the role of law in a
45 Arthur Levitt, Testimony Senate Banking Committee, "Hearing on Accounting and other Investor
Protection Issues raised by Enron and Other Public Companies", 12 Feb 2002. This is available via
the website of the Senate Banking Committee, http://banking.senate.gov/02_02hrg/021202/index.
htm.
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system where it is clearly understood that rules cannot prescribe the whole of
human behaviour.46
The Paradox of Professional Testimony: the Expectations and the
Reality of the Expert Witness
Enron recruited William Powers, Dean of the University of Texas Law School,
to be a director of the company in October 2001 and to be Chairman of the
Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation.
This committee filed its report on the main causes of the Enron bankruptcy in
the New York Bankruptcy Court on 2 February 2002.41 The Powers testimony
before the Senate Commerce Committee on 12 February 2002 focused mainly
on the SPEs and the behaviour of various actors in the drama, including the
directors, the executives and the auditors. Dean Powers testimony indicated
that many people knew what was happening:
"There's no question that virtually everyone, everyone from the board of
directors on down, virtually everyone understood that the company was
seeking to offset its investment losses with its own stock ... that's not the
way it's supposed to work."4
Powers declined to say whether he thought any laws had been broken,
deferring to the Justice Department, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion and other agencies conducting their own probes. However, he did note
that "This is very serious conduct. ... Certainly, it warrants close attention."49
The Senators also asked for Dean Powers' views on what needed to be
done to minimise the chances of a similar disaster in the future. He replied
that clearly transparency is important. Senators were disappointed that Pow-
ers had only unearthed details about a limited number of off-balance sheets
partnerships, when there were approximately three thousand SPEs. The lan-
guage of Powers' testimony is a masterpiece of skirting around the question of
illegality:
46 In some way, the Enron collapse and the question of how to punish unethical, but legal, acts goes to
the heart of the natural law versus positivist debate. It is essentially a question of how we see the rules
of just conduct for universal application. The tension between our Aristotelian and Kantian selves is
clearly not a subject for the Hong Kong Society of Accountants. Nevertheless, for the regulator
forced to consider the social values in the Hong Kong legal system and the role of law and mainte-
nance of its credibility and legitimacy, the tension cannot be ignored. See particularly, H. L. A. Hart,
The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1994), and Joseph Raz, "Two Views
of the Nature of the Theory of Law - A Partial Comparison," in Jules Coleman (ed), Hart's Postscript:
Essays on the Postscript to the Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 1-39.
47 See http://www.c-span.org/enron/powersreport.pdf.
48 David Ivanovich, "Check and balances simply broke down", Houston Chronicle, 5 Feb 2002. See
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/1240696.
49 Ibid.
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"What we found was appalling.""
"We found a systematic and pervasive attempt by Enron's management to
misrepresent the Company's financial condition."5
"The tragic consequences of the related-party transactions and account-
ing errors were the result of failures at many levels and by many people: a
flawed idea; self-enrichment by employees; inadequately-designed controls;
poor implementation; inattentive oversight; simple (and not-so simple)
accounting mistakes; and overreaching in a culture that appears to have
encouraged pushing the limits."52
"In the end this is a tragedy that could and should have been avoided.""
Congressmen also found the testimony of Joseph Berardino frustrating and
were significantly more hostile towards him as a witness. Joseph Berardino is
the Managing Partner and Chief Executive Officer of Andersen, the auditors
of Enron. Mr Berardino has testified twice. He has pointed out that there are
serious concerns about the viability of the accounting model as it is currently
used, and emphasised the need for radical reform. He has claimed that
Andersen was misled by Enron about the status of at least one SPE and ac-
cepted that the firm was guilty of an error of accounting treatment in the case
of another. He has questioned the validity of some of the Powers report and
asked that Congressmen be patient in waiting until all the facts have emerged.
The central question of why the Raptor transaction was approved has not yet
been answered.
Why It Matters for Hong Kong Law
In the USA, the stock market has reacted strongly to suggestions of account-
ing irregularities even though there have been many other such irregularities
revealed in previous financial scandals without creating such wide-spread
anxiety. There is something about Enron that has brought the questions of
auditor independence and the protection of investors to new levels of public
concern. This has important implications for Hong Kong. One is that
50 Testimony of William C. Powers, Jr. before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transporta-
tion , United States Senate, p 2, available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/hearings.
htm.
51 Ibid., p 3.
52 Ibid., p 5.
53 Ibid., p 6.
54 Mr Berardino's most recent testimony took place on 5 Feb 2002 at the US House of Representatives'
Committee on Financial Services.
Vol 32 Part 1 London or New York? 167
HeinOnline -- 32 Hong Kong L.J. 167 2002
accounting irregularities can be damaging in ways that are hard to predict.
The price of stock market stability is eternal vigilance by the regulators. Per-
haps an even more serious issue for the legal system is the need to recognise
that the gaps in the legal system that we identify as morality are as much a
part of our belief system as are the legal rules themselves.
When a chairman with a PhD in economics allows his company to col-
lapse with serious accounting irregularities" and is allowed to maintain
plausible deniability of wrong-doing, we must question if the problem lies
within the law itself. Or does the problem lie in the lack of the recognition of
the difference between law and ethics and the role that each plays in our
positivist system? According to Senator Gordon Smith, R-Ore:
"The sorrow I feel is that our confidence in free markets is so shaken by
this episode ... . But I say to people who wonder about this: 'this is not
capitalism, this is a conspiracy that may be a crime'.""6
The Enron hearings create a realisation that the certainty of accounting
principles and, possibly, the role of professional ethical codes of conduct them-
selves cannot work together in a sufficiently coherent manner to provide that
certainty for us. We therefore have to look at the question of ethics somewhat
differently. We need to identify the current role of the Hong Kong Society of
Accountants as standard setters as an essentially ethical role in the gap be-
tween law and accounting.
Should We Leave It to The Hong Kong Society of Accountants?
We believe Sir David Tweedie is correct in identifying overly precise regula-
tion as part of the problem of policing financial reporting. We are also
convinced by Arthur Levitt's characterisation of financial reporting in the
United States as a "culture of gamesmanship". He has said: "At Enron and
throughout much of corporate America, optics has replaced ethics.""
His accusation is that the balance sheet has become a lens through which
the true performance and financial health of a public company can be
magnified, exaggerated and distorted. He claims that this is more an ethical
failure than a regulatory failure, and that the failure is "systemic".
55 We are happy not to attribute criminal behaviour to any actor until it is proven. Several Congress-
men have been less circumspect.
56 Julie Mason, "Lawmakers roast Lay for firm's fall", Houston Chronicle, 13 Feb 2002, at http://www.
chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/1252641.
57 Prepared Statement of The Honorable Arthur Levitt, Jr. Oversight Hearing on "Accounting and
Investor Protection Issues raised by Enron and Other Public Companies", Tuesday, 12 Feb 2002. This
statement is available on the website of the Senate Banking Committee at http://banking.senate.
gov/0 2 02hrg/021202/index.htm.
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Each view highlights the need for accountants to have clear principles
and to apply them, if necessary, against the wishes of company management
and directors. Despite the general characterisation of accountants and audi-
tors as unimaginative and colourless, it would seem that they cannot be
constrained by well-formulated rules. We argue that both statements high-
light a gap in a legalistic approach to financial reporting which appears
ultimately to need filling by the professional standards of the accounting
profession, despite the fact that for the most part, the training of accountants
does not usually emphasise ethics, the limitations to rules or the need to iden-
tify general principles and moral values.
The difficulties of the current financial reporting model in Hong Kong are
highlighted by a simmering dispute between the Stock Exchange and the
Hong Kong Society of Accountants. On 1 April 2001, the Stock Exchange
announced a change to the listing rules in order to allow:
1 listed issuers and listing applicants, which have or are to have a pri-
mary listing on the Exchange, to adopt IAS; and
2 overseas-incorporated listed issuers and listing applicants, which
have or are to have a secondary listing on the Exchange, to adopt US
GAAP.I
The HKSA had indicated its reservations to the Stock Exchange and to
regulators in a letter on 17 November 2000, during the consultation period
on the use of International Accounting Standards.
"While we believe that, with some modification, the US GAAP proposal
could probably be adopted without causing too many difficulties, the IAS
proposal carries some significant regulatory risks if it were to be intro-
duced at the present time.""
Later, the HKSA obtained an Opinion from Counsel on the possibility of
reconciling the Stock Exchange's position with the Companies Ordinance.
We quote directly from Counsel's Opinion on this "flawed" announcement
by the Stock Exchange.
"I think that the announcement made on 1 April 2001 by the Stock Ex-
change of Hong Kong is flawed insofar as that announcement might be
58 Stock Exchange News Release, 1 Apr 2001. A copy is at http://www.hkex.com.hk/news/hkexnews/
0401news.htm.
59 This letter was made available to members of the HKSA through the Society's website at www.hksa.
org.hk.
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regarded as applicable not merely to companies incorporated outside Hong
Kong but also to Hong Kong incorporated companies."60
It is worrying that such an important part of the regulatory framework
is vulnerable to such ambiguous territorial disputes. Given the difficulty of
making sense of the complementary roles of the exchanges, the regulators,
the executive and the legal and accounting professions it would seem as though
Hong Kong requires the services of a full-time chairman of an Accounting
Standards Board who could personify the authority of the standard setter in
defining the public interest in high quality accounting standards. The lack of
an Accounting Standards Board is the most obvious gap when comparing the
regulatory financial framework in Hong Kong with London and New York.
Counsel's opinion is useful in giving a recent summary of the notion of a
"true and fair view". He refers first to earlier opinions on the "true and fair
view" for Hong Kong law and accounting standards thus:
"In those opinions the view was expressed that 'true and fair view' is a
legal concept. As such its interpretation in relation to any particular set of
accounts is a matter to be decided by the Courts. However, the Courts
would in turn look for guidance to the normal practices of professional
accountants. They would treat compliance with accepted accounting prin-
ciples as prima facie evidence that the accounts in question gave a true
and fair view."61
"Finally, the concept of the true and fair view is a dynamic concept. The
meaning remains the same over time, but the contents could be expected
to change."62
The true and fair view, therefore, ultimately rests on what accountants
regard as acceptable, and this can be expected to change over time. The Hong
Kong Society of Accountants has achieved a great deal in a short period of
less than thirty years since its creation in 1973, and its work is probably not
given the recognition that it deserves. There are, however, some important
questions raised by its apparent inability to carry the day in discussions with
the Stock Exchange.
We would argue that there must be a duty on the part of all regulators to
ensure that the total system is coherent and that the statutes, the standards,
the listing rules and the oversight by the Securities and Futures Commission
60 See http://www.hksa.org.hk.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
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are consistent with one another. Perhaps the main lesson of the Enron col-
lapse is that, as Arthur Levitt particularly has been at great pains to explain,
accounting and auditing standards are central to maintaining confidence and
trust in the capital markets generally as well as to the management of indi-
vidual companies.
Conclusion
The central question raised by the Enron debacle is how to fill the gap be-
tween the incomplete effectiveness of the law and the public expectation and
requirement of "fairness" in the workings of the economic and legal system.
A subsidiary question is how a jurisdiction can manage its role in the pro-
cesses of globalisation so that the perception of poor corporate governance,
(and, indeed, the reality of poor corporate governance), do not become barri-
ers to economic development and the influx of foreign investment. The answer
to these questions involves a need to finance and support the accounting
profession which is patrolling the frontier between the law and the moral
values of society. There is a no-man's land here that is rather uncharted terri-
tory for all of us.
After all the Congressional testimony so far, one thing is clear from the
hearings, from the phone-in television programs and from discussion in the
Internet chat-rooms. It might be technically possible for defence lawyers to
convince a jury that what happened at Enron did not involve criminality, but
in the eyes of a large part of the American public that will not be so because
no one is guilty, it will be because of serious failings in the law. We shall give
Congressman Henry Waxman the last word: "It is good that people who do
wrong should be punished."63
63 BBC World Service News, 26 Feb 2002.
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